In the United States, the term "crony capitalism" refers to a politicaleconomic system that resembles traditional political "corporatism." As used here, it describes a system in which government, big business, and powerful interest groups (especially labor unions) work together to further their joint interests. Government protects and subsidizes powerful corporations and in (implicit) exchange the government uses those businesses to carry out government policies outside of the ordinary processes of government. Unlike simple models of political rent-seeking, in which businesses use government to advance their own interests in exchange for electoral support, under crony capitalism politicians and regulators use businesses to advance the interests of politicians and interest groups in a symbiotic relationship: government creates rents and then distributes them to itself and favored interests. Many of the relationships that grew up during the financial crisis and its aftermath through legislation such as the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation illustrate the differences between crony capitalism and mere rent-seeking. Given the mutually reinforcing benefits created by this system, it is argued that prospects for reform are dim unless constitutional structures are built to restrain this system.
I. Introduction
In 1982 Mancur Olson published his famous book The Rise and Decline of Nations, which described how well-organized interest groups had systematically captured the United States government and was strangling the American economy under the aggregate weight of their successful efforts to obtain special-interest favors. 2 Olson contrasted the experience in the United States in the post-War era in which interest groups had become more and more powerful, with that in the defeated countries of Japan and Germany, in which old special-interest coalitions had been destroyed by the War, opening up an opportunity for rapid economic growth. In contrast to the dynamic economies of our conquered foes, the American economy during the post-War era increasingly came to be defined by calcification, stagnation, a demise of entrepreneurial activity, and decline.
Olson's description of an economy defined by the relationship between interest groups seeking favors from the government has subsequently come to be known (misleadingly) as "crony capitalism." The term is misleading, of course, because "crony capitalism" has little to do with capitalism, and is actually its opposite. What has come to be known as "crony capitalism" has traditionally and perhaps more accurately been known as "corporatism"-a system where businesses are privately owned, but there is a comprehensive intertangling of government and private industry, such that the success of various firms or industries is closely tied to government and government frequently uses private industry to directly or indirectly accomplished preferred political goals.
Regardless of the accuracy of the term, however, Olson's description of an economic system of a symbiotic relationship between big government, big business, and big labor aligned in a cooperative enterprise in which the government picks economic winners and losers and subsidizes and protects particular favored industries, firms, and interest groups, has come to be known as "crony capitalism."
The engine of crony capitalism is the process known as rent-seeking, a term coined by the great economist Gordon Tullock to describe the process by which these well-organized interest groups pursue government favors. 3 Tullock's profound insight was that the economic favors identified by Olson-tariffs, subsidies, preferential regulation-do not simply fall from the sky like manna from Heaven. Instead, they are usually brought through the concerted effort of interest groups expending real resources to use government power to divert wealth to themselves. So long as the cost of an interest group's investment in political lobbying activity is less than the expected benefit that the interest group can gain by lobbying the government for favorable treatment, the interest group will find it profitable to divert resources from productive uses that have a net benefit to society and the economy to lobbying expenditures aimed at merely redistributing wealth from less-organized interests to that interest group.
Olson's concern that interest groups would try to capture the government and use it as a tool to promote their private interests at the expense of the public was not novel, of course. Indeed, this was the animating concern of the Framers themselves when they established the Constitution, to provide a mechanism for the provision of public goods such as national defense and to promote internal free trade, while at the same time to guard against the capture of the government by special interests, which they referred to as "factions." The Framers' obsession with the concern that factions might divert the government to the advancement of their own interests, rather than the public interest, is reflected in their elaborate system of separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, enumerated powers, and even the Bill of Rights itself, all of which were designed to raise barriers to commandeering of government power to advance the interests of particular factions. Requiring laws to pass through the gauntlet of bicameralism (with two houses whose membership was originally composed through diverse constituencies), presentment, and judicial review, was designed to raise the level of consensus necessary to make laws and to ensure that those proposals that eventually did so would tend to reflect broad-based, sober majoritarian support consistent with the principles of republican government. The threat of crony capitalism seemed to have been tamed-the Framers had won after
all.
Yet we have learned that the crony capitalists were not exterminated, they were just hibernating. And, indeed, in the wake of the financial and economic crises that began from the creation of wealth to its mere protection and redistribution through political means. Indeed, many of the industries and companies who overturned the old order have become the crony capitalists of today.
II. Rent-Seeking and Crony Capitalism
Simply put, wealth can be obtained in two ways: it can be created or taken by force (legally or illegally) from someone else. Rent-seeking in the context can be understood as the process of using legal means to take wealth from someone else and to redistribute it to oneself. But the economic effect of rent-seeking is not merely a zero sum redistribution of wealth from A to B, because the process of conducting rent-seeking uses real resources (measured by opportunity cost) that could otherwise be used for productive purposes. 5 Gordon Tullock illustrates this point through the example of theft: the social cost of theft is not merely the question of whether I or the thief should have my television. Instead, it is the panoply of resources, measured by opportunity cost, that goes into that forced transaction. Consider the thief's perspective. From the perspective of the thief, he considers the highest-valued use of his time and human capital to be to steal wealth rather than create it. But while this decision increases the thief's economic welfare relative to alternative employment, from an economic perspective it actually reduces overall social wealth. It is important to recognize that theft is not merely zero-sum for the economy-i.e., the thief is wealthier and I am poorer. It is actually negative sum because of the opportunity cost of the resources the thief uses to be a criminal-his investment of time in casing my house waiting for me to go out, the time he invests to become better at crime rather than learning skills for some productive employment (such as driving a taxi, working at a restaurant, or whatever his best legal employment option is), and the whole network of those involved in the crime industry that make similar choices (such as those who "fence" stolen goods and the like). But there is still more diverted resources, such as the use of steel, factories, and know-how into making better locks, the manufacture and human monitoring of burglar alarm services and anti-theft protections on cars, and the entire fleet of police officers and prisons designed to hold criminals. If the thief had instead chosen to make an honest living doing something productive and wealthincreasing, rather than investing in theft, then all of these resources would have been available to be used to increase social wealth rather than being used to merely redistribute it and protect against redistribution.
Political rent-seeking has essentially the same dynamic, except that it is legal, not illegal. We can understand rent-seeking as the use of real resources to bring about wealthredistributing rather than wealth-increasing results. Here, again, the full cost must be understood in an opportunity cost manner. The cost of political rent-seeking includes such things as the opportunity cost of the time that a company's CEO spends traveling to and from Washington, meeting with politicians, taking them to dinner, or attending their fund-raisers, rather than running the business and making it more productive-or the time of other CEOs seeking to block adverse government action urged by rivals. It includes the diversion of human capital from lawyers engaging in productive activities such as drafting contracts or helping injured people gain compensation and instead into activities such as lobbying that are designed solely to redistribute rather than increase social wealth. Again, while deploying one's time and talents to lobbying is economically rational for the lawyer who is well-paid for his efforts, it diverts human capital from productive uses. Indeed, the full social cost of rent-seeking would include all the even more indirect costs, such as the social overinvestment in lawyers, which at the margin diverts some people from activities such as engineering or other professions to those such as law, lobbying, and advertising.
In this light, for current purposes "crony capitalism" can be loosely understood as an economy in which rent-seeking is taken as an ordinary incidence of business operations and a legal and socially legitimized way in which wealth can be acquired and maintained by private industry through the use of political influence rather than through market success. In short, acquiring wealth through the manipulation of government processes is both a lucrative and legitimate way of earning wealth and, quite frequently, government is implicitly seen as a partner to the transaction in that politicians likewise see private industry as a means for advancing their political interests as well.
In many less-developed countries, crony capitalism tends to be highly personal and to turn on idiosyncratic personal relationships between politicians and industry titans.
And to be sure, some rent-seeking in the United States has this same flavor. For example, it has been reported that during the early stages of the financial crisis Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson conducted a closed-door meeting with a hand-picked group of hedge fund leaders, including several former colleagues from his prior Goldman Sachs, at which he confided that he was making contingency plans to place home finance GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship-even as he was telling the public that the two firms were financially stable. 6 According to a news report, several investors at the meeting traded on the information that Paulson gave them to short the stock of the GSEs, resulting in huge gains when the two companies eventually were placed into receivership. Rational firms recognize that they can make money two ways, either by earning it or by taking it from others, and at the margin will be expected to invest resources in which ever method is expected to generate the highest return to the firm. Unlike a thief, however, using the political process to forcibly transfer wealth from others is legal. For many, the highest rate of return will result from lobbying rather than productive activity.
More than that, however, in a competitive market for capital acquisition and revenue enhancement, firms will be economically compelled to pursue rent-seeking activities if that will enhance the company's bottom line or otherwise it will inevitably go out of business. 7 Thus, so long as wealth acquisition through rent-seeking is a viable business strategy, in a competitive market businesses will be expected to pursue it.
In addition, note that individual firms and interest groups will likely be drawn into rent-seeking activity even if they would prefer not to, and more important, even if the members of the industry as a whole would prefer not to: it only takes one competitor seeking to gain economic advantage through rent-seeking to essentially force other firms to engage in rent-seeking behavior as well, or at the very least, to engage in lobbying to prevent being victimized by more politically-entrepreneurial firms. In fact, even if the members of a particular industry eschew rent-seeking, they may still be drawn into the swamp by entrepreneurial politicians engaged in the practice of rent-extraction or rent-extortion. 9 In a scheme of rent-extraction, a politician threatens to impose a cost on the members of an interest group or to rescind previously-granted benefits with the aim of prompting political action by the affected group to protect the status quo. Consider an anecdote involving the regulation of hedge funds, which historically have been largely unregulated entities. When Congress was writing the DoddFrank financial reform legislation, hedge funds came in for special scrutiny and consideration of a new regulatory regime despite scant evidence that they contributed to the crisis. In one famous incident, powerful Democratic Senator Charles Schumer reportedly invited leaders of many hedge funds to dinner where he instructed them that it was time for them to end their distance from politics and get more involved. 10 And get involved they did, pouring money into the coffers of Schumer and other Democratic politicians, enabling them to not only avoid new severe regulations on their industry but also to push for new regulations on rivals (such as banks) that would benefit hedge funds.
III. Crony Constitutions
While the roots of American crony capitalism date back to the governmentmandated cartels of the New Deal and crony capitalism grew gradually over several decades, it appears to have accelerated beginning with the financial crisis and the postcrisis era. If it is true that "War is the health of the state," 11 then economic crisis is the health of the crony capitalist state.
A. Progressivism and Crony Capitalism
The purpose of the Constitution was to try to tame the influence of rent-seekers by using various structural institutions such as separation of powers and federalism to fragment power and thereby to reduce the ability of special-interest factions to commandeer the power of the government for their advantage. Meanwhile, to the extent that these structural protections checked the ability of the federal government to act, they pushed power and authority down to state governments. While state governments were by no means immune to rent-seeking pressures, and indeed in many ways were more susceptible to the influence of some types of factions, they faced at least some (albeit imperfect) constraints resulting from the pressures of competitive federalism.
The Framers famously recognized that they were engaged in a tradeoff-that the structures that they created inevitably would end blocking both good and bad legislation-as Hamilton writes in discussing the role of the Presentment requirement in
Federalist 73, "It may be that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other." But,
Hamilton continues, he believed that the operation of the Constitution's structures would disproportionately block bad legislation designed to enrich small special-interests relative to good legislation designed to benefit the larger public, as good acts of legislation would be more likely to obtain the higher thresholds of consensus required by the Constitution's structural protections than special interest legislation would. Hamilton continues, "The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones." Not all government activity is the product of rent-seeking, of course, but the Framers were not so naïve to believe that none of it was either.
In particular, Hamilton observed that the need for checks and balances arose not from "the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn." The purpose of the Executive veto, therefore, was not merely to enable the President to protect its powers from encroachment but also "to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." Moreover, the Framers opposed the churn of frequent legislating, as more frequent legislating created more opportunities for interest groups to distort legislative outcomes to their will. Similar considerations to protect the new government from corruption by factions also pervade the Framer's justification for a bicameral legislature drawn from distinct constituencies and other structural features.
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The central purpose of the federal Constitution, therefore, was twofold: first, to protect and promote individual liberty and second, to frustrate the efforts by special interest factions to capture the government for their narrow benefit. Put differently, the goal of the Framers was to avoid institutionalized rent-seeking-although in their case they were more concerned about the effects of majoritarian factions than distortions of Olsonian minoritarian interest-group influence. Still, they recognized the same basic threat-the temptation to try to appropriate wealth through political machinations and interest group pressures instead of creating it through productive activity. The genius of the Constitution, therefore, was to try to direct energy toward the creation of wealth through market activity instead of destroying it through political activity.
All of this changed with the Progressive Era and the New Deal. As is well-known, the architects of the Progressive Era turned the political and constitutional philosophy of the Founding era on its head. 13 Whereas the Framers feared that excessive law-making would give rise to a propensity to enact special interest laws, the Progressives viewed a 12 See James Madison, The Federalist No. 62 ("Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation… It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial…. But… as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation."); see also deficit of law-making as reflecting the ability of special interests to block beneficial legislation. In other words, while the Framers recognized that constitutional checks and balances would block both good and bad laws but believed that they would block more bad laws than good, the Progressives looked at the same structures and viewed them as blocking more good laws than bad 14 Financial Stability Oversight Council, both created by Dodd-Frank. 15 All of these systems of law-making, however, see the Constitution's structural barriers as magnifying the power of special interests to block useful government programs, and the ability of the Executive to act directly as the solution.
These two competing visions of politics and politicians, therefore, suggest a testable hypothesis: if the Progressive view of politics and politicians is correct then 14 Consider, for example, the criticisms of the pre-17 th Amendment Senate, which blocked numerous acts of Progressive legislation and was supposedly a tool of money interests. See Zywicki (cited in note 12). Casual empiricism suggests that the American public today is not convinced that direct election of Senators has reduced the importance of moneyed interests in politics, which, of course, was an entirely predictable consequence of the reform. See id. removing or circumventing constitutional constraints should weaken the power of special interest groups over the government. If, however, the Framers were correct, then the erosion of the Constitution's safeguards in recent decades should increase the power of special interest groups over politics.
While the final section of this paper examines law-making in a variety of areas since the financial crisis, it hardly seems contested on either the left or right that the influence of special interests is larger today than ever before. Before turning to several examples that illustrate the point, it is first worthwhile to understand how this state of affairs came about.
The engine of rent-seeking, and hence crony capitalism, is discretion: the power of politicians to draw arbitrary and unprincipled distinctions between similarly-situated parties; for example, to provide subsidies or tax breaks to one industry but not another (such as corn farmers but not apple farmers or retailers over banks as with the Durbin Amendment to Dodd-Frank 16 ) or to benefit some workers (such as unionized workers)
over others (non-unionized). This power to single out certain parties for particular positive or negative treatment based on idiosyncratic political influence rather than principled distinctions is a necessary condition for rent-seeking to occur, as the favored group must have some disadvantaged group that provides the gains.
B. Rent-Seeking and Crony Capitalism Compared
Rent-seeking can occur in three basic fashions: direct, indirect, or rent-extraction. Direct rent-seeking occurs when an interest group is provided with a benefit that directly benefits it, such as a tariff, regulated monopoly (such as a licensed profession), or subsidy, such as subsidies for particular agricultural commodities. These regulatory schemes typically also erect barriers to entry to prevent other parties from entering and dissipating the rents generated by the regulatory scheme.
Indirect rent-seeking occurs when a seemingly neutral regulation or law is enacted which actually implicitly favors some people over others. For example, it is understood that the cost of complying with many regulations are not directly proportional to size.
Many paperwork obligations, such as filling out and filing forms, have a large fixed-cost component to them, which means that larger firms can bear those costs relatively easier than smaller firms.
Both direct and indirect rent-seeking have a corollary effect, called rent-sharing.
When economic rents are created for an industry through government action, those rents are distributed among shareholders, managers, and workers, through an explicit or implicit bargain. Thus, industries subject to regulation tend to pay above-market wages to their employees and those wage premiums disappear following deregulation. 17 The reality that some of the economic rents generated from protectionist legislation is shared with workers leads the workers to favor the regulations. How the rents are shared is a matter of bargaining between labor, management, and shareholders; one constant, however, is that workers in unionized industries tend to receive a larger share than workers in non-unionized industries. Finally, crony capitalism can also occur through rent-extraction by politicians: in this scheme, politicians threaten to impose harm or take away benefits currently held by various firms or industries, which those firms can avoid by paying tribute to the politician. In this situation, the firms lobby not for gain, but to avoid losses that are larger than their rivals.
It sometimes can be difficult to determine whether a particular action constitutes rent-seeking or rent-extraction. For example, as discussed below, while it has been argued that the vocal support of pharmaceutical companies for the Affordable Care Act was rent seeking in support of a law that would increase demand for pharmaceuticals, as an a priori matter the political activity of pharmaceutical companies could be explained equally well as a response to rent-extraction by politicians. As was explained to me by one industry insider with knowledge of the political negotiations, the Obama administration informed the members of the industry that they had "two choices: they could oppose the law and receive price controls that would impose $40 billion in annual losses on the company or they support the law and suffer only $20 billion per year in losses."
For purposes of understanding the dynamics of crony capitalism, however, it matters little whether a particular action is best understood as rent seeking, rent extraction, or some combination thereof. What matters most fundamentally is that private industry and the government become so intertwined that the economic success of firms or industries-indeed, their very survival-depends on remaining in the good graces of political actors and, quite frequently, that political grace can be given or withheld in a largely arbitrary fashion.
Banking, of course, is the prototype example, as the need for regulated banks to remain in good standing provides their regulators with the power of life and death, especially after many of the largest banks were bailed-out during the financial crisis as a result of their reckless lending practices. In turn, this provides the government with the power to use banks as a de facto arm of the federal government to carry out regulatory purposes that regulators could not accomplish directly and to do so without due process and other procedural protections, such as administrative rulemaking procedures. Consider two examples that illustrate the point.
The first is the shadowy initiative known as Operation Choke Point, which seems to have been spearheaded by the Obama Administration's Department of Justice and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Under Operation Choke Point,
government regulators targeted myriad legal, but politically unpopular industries, such as firearms dealers, coin dealers, pornography, sellers of "racist materials," home-based charities, and most intensely, payday lending. 19 The FDIC, of course, had no jurisdiction over these industries and absent any wrongdoing, the DOJ could not outlaw them either.
Yet these limitations did not stop them.
Instead, the FDIC instructed regulated banks to cease providing banking services to these particular industries, with special attention paid to payday lenders. 20 Banks were instructed not to accept bank accounts from or provide payment services for those 19 The entire list of targeted industries was promulgated informally by the FDIC in U. 10/Regional-Director-Letter.pdf (stating that providing banking services to payday lending companies "carries a high degree of risk to the institution, including third-party, reputational, compliance, and legal risk" and that as a result "activities related to payday lending are unacceptable for an insured depository institution").
industries listed on the FDIC's hit list. As described in internal government deliberations regarding the program, the objective was to "choke off the air" that these industries needed to breathe and that the banks themselves provided the "choke point" of payment processing that these businesses needed to survive. Without the ability to clear checks and process electronic payments, payday lenders and other targeted firms simply could not exist and conduct business. Notably, the government's instructions were issued without any evidence that of the industries on the affected list had done anything illegal, no due process to the adversely affected firms, and, indeed, a complete lack of transparency, including a reluctance to even admit the existence of the initiative and its reach. The FDIC's instructions were based on the vague and undefined claim that even though the subject industries were legal, dealing with them raised issues of "reputational risk" for banks and that based on this vague and undefined concept, the banks should eschew provision of banks services to them.
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Despite the lawless and secretive manner in which Operation Choke Point operated, banks got the message. Payday lenders, firearms dealers, adult performers and others suddenly found bank services-sometimes decades-long relationships-terminated summarily and without explanation. Unstated was that the reason that the targeted industries provided "reputational risk" was the circular reasoning that FDIC subjectively considered them to have a bad reputation. Noticeably absent was any rhyme or reason for why some controversial industries, such as firearms dealers, raised reputational risk, but 21 The arbitrary and political nature of the program is illustrated by the irony that at the same time that the FDIC and DOJ were strong-arming banks into dropping payment-processing services to members of these legal industries they were also urging those same banks to begin providing bank accounts and payment processing services to sellers of recreation marijuana in states such as Colorado, even though their operations were illegal under federal law that continues to prohibit the sale of marijuana. Moreover, in many instances the final terms on the loan are interwoven with the vehicle itself-for example, Toyota may run a financing special (i.e., 1.9% financing) in order to move certain types of inventory (say pick-up trucks) in some markets that aren't available for other types of vehicles or in other areas of the country. The indirect lending financial institution never has any interaction with the consumer-indeed, the consumer may not even know who the actual lender is that is providing the loan until after the deal is struck with the dealer.
Lacking the authority to reach the auto dealers, the CFPB came up with a creative solution-they decided to hold the financial institutions (the indirect lenders) responsible for any alleged discriminatory lending patterns by the auto dealers themselves. Moreover, the indirect lenders would be held responsible according to the theory of "disparate impact," making the indirect lenders responsible for any statistical anomalies that seemed to exist, regardless of the lack of any evidence of intentional discrimination. 26 The reach of this theory is especially questionable in that in offering to extend the loan, when the applicant's file is forwarded to the financial institution it contains no evidence of the applicant's race. 27 Despite all of this, the banks and financial institutions-over which the CFPB do have jurisdiction-have been held responsible for any statistical anomalies in lending terms by the auto dealers. In short, the CFPB has deputized the financial institutions as arms of the agency to regulate parties whom Congress specifically instructed them that they could not reach under Dodd-Frank. Needless to say, the CFPB announced this policy through no formal rulemaking or anything else-it simply issued an informal guidance to financial institutions. It provided no cost-benefit analysis to determine what the impact of its policy would be on the cost and availability of credit for consumers. Indeed, the CFPB did not even provide any evidence that auto dealers were 26 The CFPB has successfully extracted tens of millions of dollars in settlements from indirect auto lenders under this theory. In the case of Ally Financial, however, the CFPB collected some $80 million from the company under the theory of disparate impact but some 18 months after the case still had not distributed any of the recovery to "victims" of Ally's allegedly discriminatory behavior. The difficulty, of course, was that the CFPB had identified no actual victims of bias, leading to the challenge of identifying beneficiaries of the recovery despite having no identifiable victims. See Do Two Half Victims Make a Whole Case?, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 13, 2015) online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/do-two-half-victims-make-awhole-case-1428966741. 27 Needless to say, this reality hasn't slowed down the CFPB either-they have instructed financial institutions to use a technique called "Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding," which requires them to guess at the race of a particular borrower based on the statistical frequency of certain surnames being associated with certain races in particular zip codes. A recent assessment of the CFPB's proffered geocoding methodology found the CFPB's recommended procedures to have no statistical validity in accurately identifying the race of particular applicants. See Arthur P. Baines and Marsha J. Courchane, Fair Lending: Implications for the Indirect Auto Finance Market, American Financial Services Association (November 19, 2014) online at http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Fair-LendingImplications-for-the-Indirect-Auto-Finance-Market.pdf.
even engaged in discrimination, it simply asserted it based on questionable statistical analysis.
Both of these examples demonstrate the double-edged sword of crony capitalism.
While the federal government now protects banks from competition and even bails them out when they make foolish choices, this corporate dependency comes at a high pricethe banks now are essentially obliged to do the government's bidding when it comes to promoting specific political agendas. Moreover, much of the policymaking is done in back rooms with no other formal protections. For example, Operation Choke Point was a secretive government program whose very existence proved difficult to confirm, much less its details and implementation. The CFPB's attack on indirect auto lenders was issued through a five page "Guidance" document that provided no information about the basis for the CFPB's charge of discrimination or, originally, any methodology for determining liability, or any opportunity for public comment or other due process protections. 28 Meanwhile, those entities that are politically disfavored, such as payday lenders and firearms dealers, are to be crushed with no due process and no opportunity to defend themselves in any transparent regulatory proceeding.
This tradeoff is characteristic of crony capitalist systems-in exchange for preferential governmental treatment favored firms implicitly agree to become agents and private accomplices of governmental policy. While the use of banks to strong-arm auto dealers and payday lenders is one of the more egregious examples to date, they are expansive web of anti-money laundering rules that have long been a feature of the banking system and its regulation and the general practice of using banks as an indirect means to further political priorities and enrich favored interest groups has been the defining characteristic of the government's housing policies for decades. 29 The further entanglement of the government with the banking system and the use of the banking system to further political ends is likely to prove permanent-for example, it is easy to imagine a future conservative administration potentially using the same techniques against abortion providers, environmental groups, or other left-wing causes.
IV. Financial Crisis and the Health of Rent-Seeking State
The financial crisis and the government's response to it has entrenched crony capitalism to an unprecedented extent. Moreover, while the roots of the older lessdeveloped form of crony capitalism of the 1960s and 1970s were shallower and were able to be supplanted by the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the new more developed form of crony capitalism is more deeply rooted and may prove more difficult to unwind than that of an earlier era because it has broadened the net of powerful interests that share the fruits of crony capitalism. Indeed, the defining difference between the era of the 1970s and today is that the 1970s version was, in fact, a series of little more than transactional rent-seeking exchanges between particular industries and their regulators.
Today, however, crony capitalism has become a full-blown system of intertwined benefits to big business, big labor, and big government in which all three have a stake in the maintenance of the system. bailouts (approximately $10 billion 32 ) was a result of the disparately beneficial treatment given to the UAW in the cases relative to what labor would receive in the typical bankruptcy case. 33 The Obama Administration benefited as well: not only were the auto bailouts credited as providing pivotal votes in several states that helped President Obama to be reelected in 2012, the Administration used the bailouts to further its own policies.
For example, buried in the midst of the "sale" of Chrysler to Italian carmaker Fiat (although the term "sale" is a misnomer because Fiat essentially paid nothing for the company 34 ) were provisions that provided Fiat with still further windfalls if the company met certain environmental goals in the post-bankruptcy period. 35 Finally, the auto bailouts provided a host of opportunities for members of Congress to intervene in discrete decisions by the car-makers, such as which dealerships to close, which factories to shutter, and which suppliers of raw materials to use. 36 In addition, the taxpayer-funded "cash for clunkers" program to subsidize new auto sales amounted to an off-the-books bailout as well.
The cronyist nature of the auto bailouts was not unique to that industry, however.
For example, multiple studies have been conducted of the relationship between the bank bailouts (in the form of the TARP) and various political factors. Various studies have identified the following characteristics related to the bank bailouts: the propensity of politicians to vote for a bailout were positively correlated with the campaign contributions that they received from the banking industry and that bailout funds were directed to banks with "political clout, not those most in need of liquidity 37 ; that contributions from the financial services sector had a significant impact on the probability that a legislator would support the bailout 38 ; that banks with an executive on the board of the Federal Reserve bank were 31 percent more likely to receive bailout funds from the Capital Purchase Program and that a bank's connection to a House member on a key finance committee was associated with a 26 percent increase 39 ; that banks that engaged in more intensive lobbying efforts experienced positive abnormal returns after the TARP was announced, which suggests that the market thought that they would gain unusually large benefits from the bailout 40 ; that banks who employed a director who worked at the Treasury or one of the banking regulators were 9 percentage points more like to by approved for government funds, and that firms headquartered in the election districts of House members on key finance committees were 6 percentage points more likely to be approved 41 ; and finally, that firms that lobbied Congress were 42 percent more likely to receive a bailout than firms that did not lobby, that politically-connected banks had a 29 percent higher chance of receiving TARP funds than non-connected banks, and that banks that lobbied and/or were politically connected received larger bailouts than non-lobbying and unconnected peers 42 . While exact estimates in each of these individual studies can be challenged with various methodological quibbles, taken as a whole they paint a clear picture-that the access of banks to the taxpayer's largesse was a function of their political access, not their need. Moreover, other factors-such as the "need" for the bailout or the supposed systemic importance of a particular bank-were largely irrelevant once the political variables were taken into account.
Unsurprisingly, the post-financial crisis era has raised the dynamics of crony capitalism to still a higher and more institutionalized level. the asset bases of smaller banks has shrunk twice as fast as large banks, a result that they attribute to the high regulatory costs imposed by Dodd-Frank. 44 In addition, a detailed Mercatus Center study of the impact of Dodd-Frank on smaller banks has found that the law has imposed huge compliance costs on small banks and that they have been less able to bear those costs than large banks. 45 Thus, large banks have grown still larger as smaller community banks have disappeared from the market under Dodd-Frank's regulatory burden. In fact, large banks have admitted as much. For example, JP Morgan
Chase CEO Jamie Dimon observed that because of the aggregate costs of complying with all of the rules, regulations, and capital costs associated with Dodd-Frank has built a "bigger moat" between it and its smaller competitors. 46 Similarly, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein announced in 2010 that the bank would be "among the biggest beneficiaries" of Dodd-Frank as its regulatory costs and regulatory-created profit opportunities would be particularly advantageous to large banks that could bear those costs more easily than smaller competitors.
V.

Is There a Road Back From Cronyism?
In this sense, the clear benefits to big labor and big government distinguish modern crony capitalism from the rent-seeking state of the 1970s. One notable feature of the movement for deregulation in the 1970s was its bipartisan feature-deregulation began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter and was championed by Senator Ted Kennedy before being accelerated by President Reagan. 48 The reasons for this were somewhat unique at the time-this was during the era in which "capture" theory was a preeminent theory of understanding how regulation worked. Under capture theory, loosely stated, it was believed that laws were initially enacted to further the public interest, but when the locus of decision-making passed from Congress to the dark corridors of the bureaucracy, interest groups eventually were able to "capture" the regulators and pervert them to produce rules that favored the very industries that they were supposed to regulate. 49 The end result, in industries ranging from trucking, to airlines, to railroads, was that regulation came to function as a device to cartelize regulated industries, leading to higher prices and lower-quality service for consumers. This produced a rare opportunity for an alignment of those who championed free markets and competition with those who had become cynical about the ability of government to resist big business to push for deregulation. The result of this alliance was not only the reform of existing regulation and the crashing of old regulatory institutions but the establishment of a general suspicion of government regulation that prevailed not only during the Reagan-Bush years but into the Clinton era and early Bush era and which created the breathing room for-most notably-the Internet economy to boom as a result of its "permissionless" structure, i.e., a general presumption against regulation unless there is a demonstrated market failure and that regulation can improve the situation. the Naderites and others on the left came to repudiate the deregulatory agenda. And I asked why the Naderites turned, especially given that if anything, regulatory capture theory seems even more validated by experience since that time.
This person related a story of meeting with the great deregulator Alfred Kahn just before his death and posing the same question. Why did Nader turn away from deregulation? According to Kahn, it was because Nader came to appreciate that the provision of economic rents through regulation was the necessary condition for labor union strength and collective bargaining. As noted, a corollary of rent-seeking is rentsharing: the economic rents, once created, must be divided between shareholders, management, and workers. And the primary effect of labor unions is to bargain over the distribution of those rents and to try to direct as much as possible to union members.
Without the creation of rents in the first place, however, then there is nothing to be directed to the unions, and labor (like capital and managerial labor) will be expected to receive only a competitive return. The government creation of rents in the first place is the necessary predicate for rent-sharing. Nader eventually came to recognize that is was precisely because regulation created rents by redistributing wealth from consumers to favored industries (and eventually, their workers) that Nader rejected deregulation. In short, when confronted with the choice between labor unions on one hand and consumers on the other, Nader and his allies threw their lot with the labor unions at the expense of consumers. While the earlier left of the 1970s believed that only corporations benefited from crony capitalism, they later came to realize that regulation benefited labor unions as well by creating rents in which they could share. In the end, the left sided with the crony capitalists of labor unions and large corporations at the expense of consumers and entrepreneurs.
Today's generation of crony capitalists seem to recognize that the creation of regulatory-induced economic rents is the precondition for politicians and regulators to be able to carve up and redistribute wealth to favored interest groups. One suspects that it is an anticipated feature of the system: that the likely effect of Dodd-Frank will be to promote consolidation in virtually every industry that it touches, from banks to debt collectors and payday lenders. Industry players that are larger in size and fewer in number are easier to regulate than sprawling competitive industries with many players and lower barriers to entry. Fewer, larger, and more politically-connected firms will be easier to regulate through the subtle pressures of informal regulation without having to litigate or engage in formal rule-making and a source of political favors to politicians and regulators. And industries defined by fewer and larger firms and protected by regulation are necessary to generate a pool of rents that can be handed out to favored interest groups and politicians. Everyone wins from crony capitalism-except for the ordinary American who lacks political clout and connections.
VI. Conclusion
In 1982 Mancur Olson identified the dire state of the American economy and diagnosed its ills as resulting from rent-seeking by important corporations and interest groups that had stifled innovation and thrown a blanket of stasis over the economy. Yet
Olson's dire predictions proved unwarranted-the next two decades unleashed a period of deregulation and entrepreneurial creativity that transformed America's economy and even society.
Today we stand at a similar juncture: crony capitalism, defined as a systemic integration of political and economic activity such that large wealth can be amassed or destroyed through government connections and industry protections, has overtaken the American economy in the post-crisis era. From banking to healthcare to the Internet, fortunes today are gained and lost on the basis of political connections and regulatory
pull. Yet, perhaps Olson was not incorrect, just premature-today's crony capitalists have created a political-economic system that integrates big government, big business, and big labor in a tripartite deal to carve up the American economy. And because this iron triangle benefits precisely those groups best positioned to engage in rent-seeking, it will be harder than ever to dislodge. Crony capitalism may be here to stay.
